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ANIMAL PROTECTION LAWS OF
SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA
Alvin W.-L. See∗
This article offers an overview and assessment of the laws relating to the protection of animals in
Singapore and Malaysia. The focus is on identifying the interpretations of the statutory offences of
cruelty that will best promote their objectives and effectiveness.
I. Introduction
The 19th century saw the beginning of the era of animal protection legislation. But
it was only at the turn of the 21st century that animal law started gaining prominence
as a legal discipline. Besides the numerous books and articles written on it, it is
now taught in more than 100 law schools worldwide.1 This development, however,
is not distributed consistently across the world. The subject’s phenomenal growth
is seen mostly in North America, Europe and Australasia. In Asia, it receives very
little attention and is often perceived as a subject of trivial importance unworthy of
true scholarship, a “Mickey Mouse” subject;2 though it is precisely because reality
is far removed from Mickey’s fictional paradise that it demands serious attention.
There are, however, hopeful signs of change in light of the growing awareness about
animal suffering and ethical issues related to the treatment of animals.
In Singapore and Malaysia, which form the context for the discussions in this
paper, instances of animal cruelty are frequently reported.3 However, despite
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. I am indebted to Amanda Whitfort,
Eliza Mik, Deirdre Moss and the anonymous referee for their comments on the earlier drafts of this
paper. All errors are my own.
1 See Peter Sankoff, “Charting the Growth of Animal Law in Education” (2008) 4 J. Animal L. 105; Peter
Sankoff, “Animal Law: A Subject in Search of Scholarship” in Peter Sankoff & Steven White, eds.,
Animal Law in Australasia (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2009) at 389–400.
2 But see the works of Professor Whitfort: Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, vol. 1(2) (Hong
Kong: LexisNexis, 2008 Reissue) at c. 20 (“Animals”); Amanda S. Whitfort, “Advancing Animal
Welfare Laws in Hong Kong” (2009) 2 Australian Animal Protection L.J. 65; Amanda S. Whit-
fort, “Evaluating China’s Draft Animal Protection Law” (2012) 34(2) Sydney L. Rev. 347. See
also, Amanda S. Whitfort & Fiona M. Woodhouse, “Review of Animal Welfare Legislation in
Hong Kong” (2010), online: University of Hong Kong <http://www.law.hku.hk/faculty/staff/Files/
Review%20of%20Animal%20Welfare%20Legisaltion%20in%20HK.pdf>.
3 Much of the following discussion will also be relevant in the context of other Commonwealth countries
having similar animal cruelty laws, e.g., India, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Brunei.
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increasing public concern and awareness of the problem, very little has been done
to examine the legal aspects of it.4 The main difficulty with the existing cruelty
laws is the use of imprecise language (although this has the merit of flexibility),
which results in their susceptibility to different interpretations, the choice of which
is invariably informed by the personal views and values of persons who interpret
them. This in turn affects the extent of protection afforded to animals, both in princi-
ple and practice. While each case will necessarily turn on its own facts and the legal
meaning of cruelty is not divorced from public opinion, the legal framework within
which judgments are reached requires careful consideration. Statistics suggest that
the failure to do so contributes to the lack of enforcement of cruelty laws. This paper
seeks to address this problem by identifying interpretations of existing cruelty laws
that will best promote their objectives and effectiveness. Suggestions will also be
made as to how existing laws could be improved to meet modern international stan-
dards in the protection of animals from cruelty and in improving animal welfare. As
it is impossible to take a strictly legalistic approach to a subject so interdisciplinary
in nature, this paper will also identify and discuss some of the philosophical and
ethical issues concerning the treatment of animals. It is hoped that this paper will
convince readers of the importance of animal law, enhance understanding of it, and
attract interest in its study.
II. Taking Animal Cruelty Seriously
Many early philosophers viewed non-human animals (hereinafter ‘animals’) as being
inferior to humankind and as existing for humans’unrestricted use.5 ThomasAquinas
placed humans at the top of the divine creation on the basis of their capacity for
intellectual and rational thought6 and declared that it is “not wrong for man to make
use of [animals], either by killing or in any other way whatever”.7 Samuel Pufendorf
also doubted if animals could be the subjects of legal protection due to their inability
to reason.8 Insofar as they suggest that we humans could inflict suffering on animals
simply because we possess qualities that animals do not, the supposedly rational
minds supply a counter-intuitive answer.9 The overemphasis on the differences
4 But see SPCA (Singapore), “Proposal for Legislative Reform: Recommendations to Strengthen
Animal Welfare Laws in Singapore” (2011), online: Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals, Singapore <http://www.spca.org.sg/documents/spca_proposalforlegislativereform.pdf> [SPCA
(Singapore), “Proposal”].
5 For a brief history of human attitude towards animals, see Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, 2nd
ed. (London: Pimlico, 1995) at c. 5; Steven M. Wise, Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal Rights for Ani-
mals (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2000) at cc. 2–4 [Wise, Rattling the Cage]; Margit Livingston,
“Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law’s Role in Prevention” (2001) 87 Iowa L. Rev. 1 at
7–21.
6 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, ed. & trans. by Anton C. Pegis in Basic Writings of
Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 2 (New York: Random House, 1945) at 145, 146, 219–225.
7 Ibid. at 222.
8 Samuel Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations trans. by Basil Kennet (London: 1749) at 118: “it
is impossible to conceive how a Creature should be capable of Law, and at the same time incapable of
Reason”.
9 See Singer, supra note 5 at 6: “If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle one human
to use another for his or her own ends, how can it entitle humans to exploit nonhumans for the same
purpose?”. Whether humans possess better qualities than animals is also open to question. See Henry
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between humans and animals overlooks an important quality that both humans and
animals share: sentience. It is argued that the quality of sentience, which includes
the capacity for experiencing suffering, should alone form the basis for the ethical
treatment of animals.10 As Jeremy Bentham rightly said, “the question is not, Can
they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”.11 Whatever the prevailing
views were at the times of Aquinas and Pufendorf, we have certainly moved on from
those views.
There is also a practical reason why it is important to take animal cruelty seri-
ously. As Jeremy Bentham expresses, “[c]ruelty towards animals is the road to
cruelty towards men”.12 Numerous studies have revealed the connection between
animal cruelty and violence against humans.13 In Public Prosecutor v. Hooi Yin
Wang David, Reddy D.J. observed: “Studies have found that those with a history of
repeated acts of intentional violence towards animals are at a higher risk for exhibit-
ing similar violence against humans in the future”.14 In Public Prosecutor v. Seah
Kian Hock, Yong C.J., in sentencing the accused to imprisonment for brutally beat-
ing up a dog, took into consideration his two previous convictions for voluntarily
causing hurt because they “disclose the same propensity to violence he has shown in
the present offence”.15 These comments represent judicial recognition that enforce-
ment of animal cruelty laws plays an important role in furthering the broader goal of
preventing violence towards humans.
Once it is recognised that animals are worthy of protection, the focus shifts to the
extent to which they should be protected. We shall consider briefly the two main
approaches to animal protection: welfarism and abolitionism. Although welfarists
and abolitionists regularly stand on the same side in tackling animal cruelty, the
Beston, The Outermost House (NY: Penguin Books, 1988) at 25: “the animal shall not be measured
by man. In a world older and more complete than ours they move finished and complete, gifted by
extensions of the senses we have lost or never attained, living by voices we shall never hear”. See
also, Gary L. Francione, “Animals—Property or Persons?” in Gary L. Francione, Animals as Persons:
Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) at 25,
59: “What makes the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror or use symbolic language better in a moral
sense than the ability to fly or breathe underwater? The answer, of course, is that we say so” [Francione,
“Property or Persons?”].
10 See e.g., Bernard E. Rollin, The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain and Science
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Webster, Animal Welfare: Limping Towards Eden
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005) at c. 3.
11 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. 2 (London:
W. Pickering, 1823) at 236.
12 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, at c. XV in John Bowring, ed., The Works of Jeremy Bentham,
vol. 1 (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1843) at 560. See also, Immanuel Kant, Duties to Animals and Spirits,
eds. & trans. by Peter Heath & J.B. Schneewind in Lectures on Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997) at 212: “a person who already displays… cruelty to animals is also no less hardened towards
men”.
13 See e.g., Randall Lockwood, “Animal Cruelty and Violence Against Humans: Making the Connection”
(1999) 5 Animal L. Rev. 81; Joseph G. Sauder, “Enacting and Enforcing Felony Animal Cruelty Laws
to Prevent Violence Against Humans” (2000) 6 Animal L. Rev. 1; Livingston, supra note 5. See also
the works in Andrew Linzey, ed., The Link Between Animal Abuse and Human Violence (Brighton;
Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2009); Sharon L. Nelson, “The Connection Between Animal Abuse
and Family Violence: A Selected Annotated Bibliography” (2011) 17 Animal L. Rev. 369.
14 [2006] SGDC 204 at para. 19.
15 [1997] 1 S.L.R. (R.) 491 at para. 4 (H.C.) [Seah Kian Hock].
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two approaches differ in fundamental ways.16 Welfarists accept the use of animals
for human benefit but seek to make it more humane through regulations, e.g., by
requiring the animals to be treated decently in terms of food, housing and overall
care. Regulations based on this humane treatment principle normally invoke the
utilitarian balancing exercise, pitting animal interests against human interests. The
former can be overridden, entitling us to inflict suffering on animals, if the result of
doing so is sufficiently beneficial to humans.17 The use of animals in agriculture and
scientific research are good examples.
The welfarist approach is often criticised. Welfare regulations may make us feel
better by providing excuses to inflict or be comfortable with animal suffering. But
they fail to challenge many practices that cause animal suffering, thus limiting their
practical effect. The notion of ‘necessary suffering’ is often construed broadly in
favour of humans. For example, many animals are lawfully bred (even genetically
modified) and used for research, even those where the expected benefits to humans
are very remote.18 Even more animals are lawfully bred and killed for food although
it is not strictly speaking ‘necessary’ for most contemporary humans to consume
meat. We may even be better off in terms of health being vegetarians.19 The reason
why such exploitation continues is because the utilitarian scale is not a balanced one.
In the Canadian case of Menard, where the court set out a utilitarian balancing test,
Lamer J.A. said:20
[A]nimal is inferior to man… It will often be in the interests of man to kill
and mutilate… animals, subjugate them and, to this end, to tame them with all
the painful consequences this may entail for them… This is why, in setting the
standards for the behaviour of men towards animals, we have taken into account
our privileged position in nature and have been obliged to take into account at the
outset the purpose sought…
The unbalanced scale may be partly attributed to the treatment of animals as prop-
erty.21 Any balancing of interests is inevitably human-biased since we are pitting
16 See Gary L. Francione & Robert Garner, The Animal Rights Debate: Abolition or Regulation? (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2010). See also the collection of essays in Cass R. Sunstein & Martha
C. Nussbaum, eds., Animal Rights: Current Debate and New Directions (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
17 See Ford v. Wiley (1899) L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 203 at 209: “Men constantly inflict great pain on one another
and upon the brute creation, either for reasons of beneficence, as in surgery and medicine, or under
sanctions which warrant its infliction, as in war or in punishment” (per Lord Coleridge C.J.). See also
R. v. Menard (1978) 43 C.C.C. (2d.) 458 (Que. C.A.) at 464 [Menard]: “Certain experiments, alas,
inevitably very painful for the animal, prove necessary to discover or test remedies which will save a
great number of human lives” (per Lamer J.A.).
18 See Singer, supra note 5 at c. 2; Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1995) at c. 8 [Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law]; Gary L. Francione,
Introduction to Animal Rights: Your Child or the Dog? (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2000)
at c. 2 [Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights].
19 Francione, “Property or Persons?”, supra note 9 at 36: “Nearly all of our animal use can be justified
only by habit, convention, amusement, convenience, or pleasure. To put the matter another way, most
of the suffering that we impose on animals is completely unnecessary”.
20 Menard, supra note 17 at 464. See also discussion in Part V.B.2 below.
21 See Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, supra note 18; Gary Lawrence Francione, Rain Without
Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996)
[Francione, Rain Without Thunder]; Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights, supra note 18. See also,
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the interest of what is legally regarded as ‘property’ (the animal) against that of its
owner.22 As laws based on the welfare model are predicated on animals’ status as
property, animal interest almost never prevails.23
Abolitionists, on the other hand, advocate for an end to all animal exploitation.24
They argue that humans must stop treating animals as property25 and as means to
human ends.26 Instead, animals should be recognised as possessing an inherent
right not to be harmed which is free from issues of utility.27 Such a right cannot
be overridden by the fact that benefit will accrue to humans, not even if animals are
treated in a ‘humane’ manner. By analogy, it is unlawful to kill a person for food
even if we could save 20 others from dying of starvation by doing so, or to conduct
non-consensual experiments on a person because doing so might result in a cure for
some serious illnesses.28
Whatever the merits of abolitionism, the idea that humans should give up their
dominion over animals will sit uneasily with traditional thinking.29 The animal
Wise, Rattling the Cage, supra note 5; Steven M. Wise, Drawing the Line: Science and the Case for
Animal Rights (Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, 2002) [Wise, Drawing the Line].
22 Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights, supra note 18 at xxiv–xxv: “The property status of animals
renders completely meaningless any balancing that is supposedly required under the humane treatment
principle or animal welfare laws, because what we really balance are the interests of property owners
against the interests of their animal property. It does not take much knowledge or property law or
economics to recognize that such a balance will rarely, if ever, tip in the animal’s favor… Because
animals are merely property, we are generally permitted to ignore their interests and to inflict the most
horrendous pain and suffering or death on them when it is economically beneficial to us”. See also,
Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights, supra note 18 at c. 3.
23 Although the laws may not explicitly say so, they are mostly interpreted against this background. See
Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law, supra note 18 at 5: “These laws are interpreted against
a background that effectively obscures the difference between animal property and other forms of
property”.
24
“[W]e must empty the cages, not make them larger”, demanded Professor Regan: Tom Regan, Empty
Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights (Lanham, MD: Rowland & Littlefield, 2004) at 61.
See also Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, 2nd ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 2004) at xiv [Regan, The Case for Animal Rights].
25 See particularly, Professor Francione’s works: supra note 21.
26 Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, supra note 24 at 286: “We must never harm individuals who
have inherent value on the grounds that all those affected by the outcome will thereby secure ‘the best’
aggregate balance of intrinsic values (e.g., pleasures) over intrinsic disvalues (e.g., pain)”.
27 While many scholars regard sentience alone as sufficient to attract entitlement to such a right, there are
some who think otherwise. Professor Regan recognises such a right only in animals that satisfy the
“subject-of-a-life” criterion, i.e. “if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of
the future, including their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain;
preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a
psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares
well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of
their being the object of anyone else’s interests”: ibid. at 243. Similarly, for Professor Wise, “a being
has practical autonomy and is entitled to personhood and basic liberty rights if she: (1) can desire;
(2) can intentionally try to fulfill her desires; and (3) possesses a sense of self sufficiency to allow her to
understand, even dimly, that it is she who wants something and it is she who is trying to get it”: Wise,
Drawing the Line, supra note 21 at 32. Cf. Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights, supra note 18 at
xxxii–xxxiv.
28 See e.g., R. v. Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.
29 For the various obstacles (physical, economic, political, religious, historical, legal and psychological)
that the abolitionists (as well as the welfarists) confront, see Steven M. Wise, “Animal Rights, One Step
at a Time” in Sunstein & Nussbaum, supra note 16 at 19–50.
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cruelty laws of Singapore and Malaysia are based on the welfare model and are
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. However, by understanding some of the
problems associated with welfarism, we may be able to optimise animal protection
under the existing regime, particularly by casting away traditional biases towards
animals in the interpretation of cruelty laws.30 While this may not achieve the
abolitionist ideal of ending all animal exploitation, it will certainly contribute to a
reduction in animal suffering.
III. Background
During 2011–12, Singapore’s Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (the
“SPCA (Singapore)”) received and investigated 1017 alleged cruelty complaints.31
A significant number of these cases were concerned with neglect by owners, and
many were considered to be serious enough to warrant enforcement actions. In
the same period, the Agri-Food & Veterinary Authority (the “AVA”) investigated
444 alleged cruelty complaints of which only two offenders were prosecuted and
two others were imposed with composition fines.32 The low prosecution rate in
Singapore has been a consistent trend over the years. There were only about 45
criminal convictions for animal cruelty between 1985 and 2012.33 Out of these, five
were concerned with neglected animals, which were found in very poor conditions
(dead, injured, sick, emaciated, etc). The rest involved blatant acts of cruelty such
as abuse and killing. These statistics suggest that there is an enforcement gap,
despite frequent statements by the AVA that it takes animal cruelty seriously. The
AVA’s annual reports appear to shed some light on the matter. In its 2010–11 annual
report, for example, it was stated: “In FY 2010, AVA investigated 410 cases of
alleged animal cruelty/abuse. The majority of cases did not involve animal cruelty.
Instead, they involved welfare issues, for which counseling was provided or warnings
issued”.34 We cannot tell for sure how theAVA draws its line between cases involving
cruelty and those involving merely ‘welfare issues’. An informed guess is that cases
falling within the latter category mostly involved neglect or prolonged confinement,
especially where the animals do not appear to have suffered.35 But was it because
the AVA thought that such cases could not amount to cruelty at law, or was it after
applying the relevant legal tests to each case that it decides that there was no cruelty?
30 See e.g., Singer, supra note 5. Professor Singer is a utilitarian who rejects “speciesism”, i.e. “a prejudice
or attitude or bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members
of other species” (ibid. at 6). He argues for the principle of equal consideration, which demands that
the interests of every being affected by an action be taken into account and given the same weights as
the like interests of any other being regardless of species difference (ibid. at 5). Animals, like humans,
have the like interest in not suffering. Such interest shall not be regarded as any less important than the
equivalent human interest when applying a balancing test (ibid. at 220).
31 SPCA (Singapore), Annual Report: July 2011 to June 2012, at 10–13.
32 AVA, Annual Report 2011–2012 at 42.
33 These statistics were derived from the personal record of Deirdre Moss (previously Animal Welfare
Director of SPCA (Singapore)), which appears to be more complete than those set out in the AVA’s
annual reports.
34 AVA, Annual Report 2010–2011 at 42.
35 Although the AVA has a record of imposing composition fines on owners who keep their animals in
“poor living conditions” (AVA, Annual Report 2008–2009 at 42), it is difficult to know exactly what it
regards as ‘poor’.
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The worry here is that the question of what may amount to cruelty at law might not
have been properly considered. We shall see later that cruelty and poor welfare are
not mutually exclusive.36 While poor welfare does not necessarily mean that there
is cruelty, cruelty always involves poor welfare. The question is, at what point of the
welfare spectrum would one regard cruelty to have occurred? Clearly, the AVA takes
a narrow view of what amounts (or may amount) to cruelty compared to the SPCA
(Singapore) and the complainants. It is important that the AVA aligns its definition of
cruelty with public opinion, which (as shall be explained later) informs the meaning
of cruelty at law.
The situation in Malaysia is far less encouraging. In 2005, a dog was subjected
to such severe and prolonged neglect, resulting in such ill health that it had to be
euthanised.37 Its unremorseful owner was fined a measly RM100.38 In 2011, a
woman who tortured and later stomped three kittens to death was fined RM400.39
In 2012, a hawker who poured boiling water on a stray dog was fined RM200 and
sentenced to one day’s imprisonment. In the same year, owners of a cat hotel left 150
cats unattended during the Hari Raya holidays, causing severe starvation and dehy-
dration. Convicted of 30 counts of cruelty by neglect, they were fined RM6,000 and
sentenced to three months of imprisonment.40 This was the first time an animal cru-
elty case reached the High Court, and also the first time a sentence of imprisonment
beyond a few days was imposed. More recently in 2013, a maid was sentenced to one
year’s imprisonment for killing her employer’s dog.41 These cases more or less sum
up the history of animal cruelty prosecution in Malaysia.42 Countless complaints to
the Department of Veterinary Services (the “DVS”) were unheeded even when the
perpetrators were identified.43 Neither does the emphasis on wildlife conservation
help. In 2012, the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (the “PERHILITAN”)
ordered six zoos to be closed down for failing to meet legal standards relating to
premise safety and cleanliness and animal health. But no person has yet been prose-
cuted. The dismal record in enforcing cruelty laws and the weak rulings where cases
do go to courts have been the subjects of much public criticism.
The situation in Malaysia is also more complicated due to what may be regarded
as legally sanctioned cruelty towards stray dogs.44 Shooting of stray dogs is still
36 See Part VIII.B below.
37 Sheena, a seven year-old dog, was found tied and lying on her own faeces beside a rusty bowl of
dirty water. She had a bloated abdomen, clearly visible ribcage, and was infested with ticks. Post-
mortem showed that she had empty bladder and stomach, shrunken kidneys, a brittle ribcage (indicating
inadequate nutrition since she was young), and haemorrhage in her lungs (a sign of pneumonia). See
“RM100 for dog abuse”, The Star (18 October 2009) at 3.
38 The owner was reported to have said: “The tick infestation was a small problem and there was enough
food and water for the dog, which was already old and sickly anyway” (ibid.).
39 See “Woman fined RM400 for abusing three kittens”, The Star (28 July 2011) at 10.
40 See “Jail term on Petknode owners lauded”, The Star (25 October 2012) at 22.
41 See “Maid jailed for killing dog”, The Star (26 January 2013) at 29.
42 According to unofficial statistics from the Department of Veterinary Services, there were only four
prosecutions between 2006 and 2010. It is safe to conclude that the total number of prosecutions in the
past ten years is below ten.
43 The SPCA (Selangor) alone received more than 700 alleged cruelty complaints in 2011.
44 This may be attributed to certain cultural and religious biases. See e.g., KhaledAbou El Fadl, The Search
for Beauty in Islam: A Conference of the Books (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) at c. 80;
Richard C. Foltz, Animals in Islamic Tradition and Muslim Cultures (Oxford: Oneworld Publications,
2006) at c. 7.
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carried out in certain parts of Malaysia. Capture and euthanasia, which are now more
common, are often carried out cruelly.45 Dog pounds managed by municipal councils
are also frequently reported to have housed the animals in deplorable conditions,
many dying from illnesses, hunger or thirst before they are euthanised.46 The Pulau
Ketam incident, which attracted the attention of international media, is also worth
mentioning.47 In 2009, inhabitants of a village, with the encouragement of their local
councillor, trapped stray dogs in the hundreds and dumped them on an uninhabitable
island of mangrove swamp. Without sources of food, many resorted to cannibalism.
Those that managed to return by swimming were thrown back into the sea. The
irony is that the perpetrators of cruelty were persons charged with enforcing the
cruelty laws. Unsurprisingly, no person has ever been held responsible for such
institutionalised cruelty.
IV. Preliminary Matters
A. Sources
In Singapore, the main cruelty offences are set out in the Animals and Birds Act.48
The equivalents in Malaysia are found in the Animals Act 195349 and theWildlife Con-
servation Act 2010.50,51 The offences in the ABA (SG), the AA (MY) and the WCA
(MY) (hereinafter the “Main Statutes”) are largely derived from the now replaced
Protection of Animals Act 1911.52 Thus, many of the old English (and Scottish)
case law and academic literature53 continue to afford helpful guidance in their inter-
pretation, especially in light of the dearth of local case law on the subject. Other
cruelty offences are also found in Singapore’s Wild Animals and Birds Act,54 and
45 While the DVS issued guidelines on humane stray control, these were routinely ignored by the municipal
councils, who do not regard themselves as falling within the jurisdiction of the DVS.
46 See “Strays must be treated right”, The Star (26 April 2010) at 6.
47 See “The height of animal cruelty”, The Star (30 May 2009) at 12.
48 Cap. 7, 2002 Rev. Ed. Sing., s. 42 [ABA (SG)].
49 Act 647, 2006 Rev. Ed., s. 44 [AA (MY)].
50 Act 716, s. 86 [WCA (MY)].
51 The AA (MY), supra note 49, only applies in Peninsular Malaysia (i.e. West Malaysia, which consists
of eleven states and two federal territories, and accommodates roughly 80 percent of Malaysia’s popu-
lation). The WCA (MY), supra note 50, applies in Peninsular Malaysia and in the Federal Territory of
Labuan (the latter is located in East Malaysia, which also consists of the states of Sabah and Sarawak).
Due to historical and political reasons, Sabah and Sarawak enact their own sets of laws: see Cruelty to
Animals (Prevention) Ordinance 1925 (Cap. 31) (Sabah), s. 3; Wildlife Conservation Enactment 1997
(No. 6 of 1997) (Sabah), s. 37; Veterinary Public Health Ordinance 1999 (Cap. 32) (Sarawak), s. 73;
Wild Life Protection Ordinance 1998 (Cap. 26) (Sarawak), s. 44. With the exception of Sabah’s 1997
Enactment (which sets out a simpler offence of killing and causing injury by recklessness), the cruelty
offences in the other statutes are similar to those in the AA (MY) and the WCA (MY). To keep matters
simple, this paper will refer only to the AA (MY) and the WCA (MY).
52 (U.K.), 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 27 [PAA (U.K.)]. The PAA (U.K.) was applicable to the whole of the U.K. except
Scotland. See also, the Protection of Animals (Scotland) Act 1912 (U.K.), 2 & 3 Geo. V, c. 14, which
was identical in substance to the PAA (U.K.).
53 Much assistance is derived from Professor Radford’s comprehensive treatment of the PAA (U.K.): Mike
Radford, Animal Welfare Law in Britain: Regulation and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001).
54 Cap. 351, 2000 Rev. Ed. Sing., s. 5(1) [WABA (SG)].
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also in the penal codes of Singapore55 and Malaysia56 (hereinafter “Penal Codes”).
An overview of the offences is set out in Part V.A. below.
B. Animals
1. Definitions
The AA (MY)57 and the Penal Codes58 define an animal as “any living creature,
other than a human being”. Sir Stephens criticised this definition as “superfluous”
and “of doubtful correctness” since “[i]t would include an angel, frog spawn, and
probably a tree”.59 While this definition could certainly include also bacteria and
aliens, common sense and the principle of purposive construction would require us
to read it to mean any non-human members of the kingdom Animalia.60 The ABA
(SG) escaped such criticism for it does not define an animal but merely states that it
includes: “any beast, bird, fish, reptile or insect”.61
Although the law purports to extend its protection to all animals, cruelty against
certain kinds of animals (such as insects, reptiles and fish) is often taken less seri-
ously.62 While some say that these animals are small, simple or unintelligent, it is
doubtful that such characteristics should have any relevance in deciding whether they
should be protected from cruelty. As said earlier, it is their capacity for experiencing
pain or suffering that matters. Recent research has shown that some animals that are
not normally thought of as capable of feeling pain and suffering are so capable.63
Thus, Professor Radford said:64
While it may not be possible to prove indisputably that other species [i.e. other
than man] are able to suffer, the (growing) body of scientific evidence is such that,
first, the precautionary principle requires that policy makers should proceed on
the assumption that this is indeed so; and, secondly, the onus has passed to those
who believe this not to be the case to demonstrate otherwise.
2. Further distinctions
(a) Wild animals and non-wild animals: Malaysia is one of the most biologically
diverse places in the world, with roughly two-third of its land area covered by tropical
55 Cap. 224, 2008 Rev. Ed. Sing., s. 428 [PC (SG)].
56 Penal Code, Act 574, 1997 Rev. Ed., ss. 428, 429 [PC (MY)].
57 AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 43.
58 PC (MY), supra note 56, s. 47; PC (SG), supra note 55, s. 47.
59 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of The Criminal Law of England, vol. 3 (London: Macmillan
and Co., 1883) at 306, referring to the equivalent section in the Indian Penal Code.
60 See e.g., Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, vol. 1(2) (Hong Kong: LexisNexis, 2008 Reissue) at
para. 20.001: “‘animal’ includes all animals not belonging to the human race”.
61 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 41. The AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 2 also sets out the same list.
62 In 2011, however, a domestic helper was convicted and fined SG$7,000 for killing 29 fish belonging to
her employer. Unable to pay the fine, she was imprisoned for one month. See “Maid jailed for killing
employer’s 29 fish”, Today (2 July 2011) at 6.
63 See e.g., Victoria Braithwaite, Do Fish Feel Pain? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
64 Radford, supra note 53 at 271 [emphasis added].
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rain forests. The WCA (MY) was among a series of legislation enacted to give better
effect to the National Policy on Biological Diversity adopted in 1998, roughly four
years after Malaysia became a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity in
1994. Cruelty to protected wildlife comes under the purview of the WCA (MY). The
First and Second Schedules set out the lists of “protected” and “totally protected”
wildlife, respectively. Animals that do not fall within either schedule come within
the purview of the AA (MY), even if they are commonly regarded as wildlife.65 The
WCA (MY) imposes heavier penalties for cruelty than the AA (MY).66
Under the WABA (SG), wild animals includes “all species of animals and birds
of a wild nature, but does not include domestic dogs and cats, horses, cattle, sheep,
goats, domestic pigs, poultry and ducks”.67 Curiously, in contrast with the position
in Malaysia, the killing of a wild animal (which is the only cruelty offence set out in
the WABA (SG)) attracts lesser penalties than the killing of a non-wild animal.68
(b) Categorising animals based on economic worth: The PC (MY) draws a distinction
between (i) “animals of the value of [RM5] or upwards”69 and (ii) “elephant, camel,
horse, mule, buffalo, bull, cow or ox, whatever may be the value thereof, or any other
animal of the value of [RM25] or upwards”.70 Cruelty against the latter group of
animals attracts heavier penalties.71 Such distinction is clearly based on the treatment
of animals as economic commodities,72 which the abolitionists strongly oppose.73
Animals should not be regarded as mere commodities whose value is measured in
terms of their economic worth to humans, especially where cruelty is concerned.
The PC (SG) was rightly amended in 2007 such that the cruelty offence now applies
to “any animal”.74
The now outdated Singaporean case of Public Prosecutor v. Gracia Michael75
will continue to afford guidance on the interpretation of the PC (MY). In this case,
the accused kicked the complainant’s dog in its stomach, causing its death. He was
initially charged under s. 429 as the dog cost $1300, butYong C.J. amended the charge
to one under s. 428 and convicted him. Yong C.J. explained that the phrase “any other
animal” under s. 429 “must be interpreted in accordance with the ejusdem generis
rule and be construed strictly to refer only to like animals, i.e. any other animals used
in husbandry or for work such as the specific examples given”.76 On the other hand,
65 The definition of animals in the AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 43 explicitly includes wild animals.
66 See Part VII below.
67 WABA (SG), supra note 54, s. 2.
68 See Part VII below. This is despite the fact that Singapore is also a signatory to the Convention on
Biological Diversity. But see Part VIII.A below for a possible rationale for treating domestic animals
more favourably.
69 PC (MY), supra note 56, s. 428.
70 Ibid., s. 429.
71 See Part VII below.
72 The cruelty offences under the Penal Codes fall under the general heading of ‘Mischief’ alongside other
mischiefs of causing loss or damage to property. The property status of animals in the Penal Codes is
also explicit in s. 430, which uses the phrase “animals which are property”.
73 See Part II above.
74 PC (SG), supra note 55, s. 428. Section 429 was repealed.
75 [1999] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 249 (H.C.).
76 Ibid. at para. 20.
Sing. J.L.S. Animal Protection Laws of Singapore and Malaysia 135
s. 428 is concerned with “mischief involving animals which are of lesser economic
significance, including domestic pets”.77
V. The Offences
A. Overview
Each of the Main Statutes set out a list of cruelty offences.78 Most important are
the offence of ‘cruel ill-treatment’ and the offence of ‘causing unnecessary suffering’
by wanton, unreasonable or wilful conduct (hereinafter “General Offences”), which
form the focus of this paper. Despite their disparity in wording, both cover much the
same ground, importing a duty not to inflict unnecessary suffering as well as a duty
of care to prevent or alleviate unnecessary suffering.79 The remaining offences are
concerned with specific conducts or activities: (i) failure to supply sufficient food or
water; (ii) confine, convey, lift or carry an animal in such manner or position which
causes it unnecessary pain or suffering; (iii) abandonment; (iv) animal fighting and
baiting; (v) using an unfit animal for work or labour; (vi) kill, poison, maim or render
useless an animal; and (vii) bestiality (hereinafter “Specific Offences”). It is also
an offence to commit cruelty indirectly, by procuring, aiding or permitting an act of
cruelty by another person (hereinafter “Secondary Offences”). While the offences
differ in the required elements of fault, a consistent theme is the protection of animals
from unnecessary suffering.
B. Cruel Ill-Treatment
1. Ill-treatment
Under the ABA (SG) and the AA (MY), a person commits an offence if he “cruelly
beats, kicks, ill-treats, overrides, overdrives, overloads, tortures, infuriates or terrifies
any animal”.80 While the scope of the offence is necessarily curtailed by the list of
specified conducts, the term “ill-treats” has been invoked in reference to a broad range
of conducts. It has also been interpreted to refer to an omission. In R. v. Banjoor,
Murison C.J. in the Straits Settlements Supreme Court said: “I have not the slightest
doubt in my mind that ill-treatment can occur by omission as well as by action. If a
woman suffers her child to die for want of feeding, who on earth could say she had not
77 Ibid. at para. 22.
78 These were described as “a somewhat odd collection to the contemporary observer, reflecting as they
do the nineteenth-century origins of the [statutes]”: Radford, supra note 53 at 218.
79 Both were derived from the first and second limbs of the PAA (U.K.), supra note 52, s. 1(1)(a), which
were in turn derived from the Cruelty to Animals Act 1849 (U.K.), 12 & 13 Vict., c. 92, s. 2 and the Wild
Animals in Captivity Protection Act 1900 (U.K.), 63 & 64 Vict., c. 33, s. 2, respectively. The PAA (U.K.),
being merely a consolidating statute, simply took two provisions serving the same purpose (albeit in
different contexts) and merged them into one section. See Radford, supra note 53 at 200. This awkward
union was often criticised: Mike Radford, “Animal Cruelty and the Courts: An Analysis of s.1(1)(a)
of the Protection of Animals Act 1911” (1998) 162 Justice of the Peace Reports 656 (“convoluted”);
Bandeira and Brannigan v. R.S.P.C.A. (2000) 164 Justice of the Peace Reports 307 at 308 (“really
rather unwieldy”); Isted v. C.P.S. (1998) 162 Justice of the Peace Reports 513 at 519 (“unnecessarily
confusing”).
80 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(1)(a); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(a).
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ill-treated the child? And so with the owner of an animal”.81 However, the offence
of cruel ill-treatment is rarely invoked for cruelty by omission, and is generally used
in circumstances involving positive conduct.82 The offence of ‘causing unnecessary
suffering’ (see Part V.C below), on the other hand, is commonly invoked in cases of
cruelty by omission.
2. Unnecessary suffering
The ill-treatment must be committed cruelly. While a layperson may understand
“cruelly” to mean ‘viciously’or ‘brutally’, the courts have departed from its ordinary
meaning, interpreting it to mean the causing of unnecessary suffering.83 This is a
reason why cruelty in law may fall short of torture, reflecting the sentiments of Yong
C.J. in Seah Kian Hock that we are “not so inured in apathy” that only torture will
arouse our outrage.84 It follows that there is also no requirement that the suffering be
substantial or prolonged. In the Scottish case of Patchett v. Macdougall, Lord Hunter
explained that the concept of unnecessary suffering “imports the idea of the animal
undergoing, for however brief a period, unnecessary pain, distress or tribulation”.85
Mental suffering is also relevant, especially since infuriating or terrifying an animal
may amount to an offence.86 Therefore, the possibility of cruelty must not be too
readily dismissed simply because the animal does not appear to have suffered physical
harm.
But some suffering, no matter how slight, must be proven for the offence of cruel
ill-treatment to be made out. Where an animal is killed instantaneously, for example,
the killer cannot be convicted of an offence that requires proof of unnecessary suf-
fering. In Patchett v. Macdougall, the accused deliberately and with declared intent
shot a dog in its head with a shot gun at point-blank range, killing it.87 The dead dog
was found with a large wound in its forehead between the eyes with what appeared
to be brain matter exposed and a pool of clotting blood beneath its head. As the
prosecution did not adduce evidence to show that the dog survived for a period or
had in any way suffered, the accused was acquitted of a charge of causing unneces-
sary suffering to the dog. In response to the suggestion that the dog has “suffered
loss of life”, Wheatley L.J.-C. said: “Metaphysical considerations apart, I do not
consider that the structure and purport of the Act opens the door to that view”.88
81 [1930] S.S.L.R. 31 [Banjoor]. The defendant was charged and convicted under the Cruelty to Animals
Ordinance (No. 77) of 1902 (Straits Settlement), s. 7, which is in pari materia with the ABA (SG), supra
note 48, s. 42(1)(a) and the AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(a).
82 But see Hopson v. D.P.P. (11 March 1997), unreported (Q.B.) [Hopson]. Quotations are taken from the
unreported transcript of the judgment.
83 See Budge v. Parsons (1863) 122 E.R. 145; Bowyer v. Morgan (1906) 70 Justice of the Peace Reports
253 [Bowyer]; Barnard v. Evans [1925] 2 K.B. 794 [Barnard]; Ford v. Wiley, supra note 17.
84 Seah Kian Hock, supra note 15 at para. 2.
85 1983 Justiciary Cases 63 at 67 [Patchett]. See also Murphy v. Manning (1876–77) L.R. 2 Ex.D. 307 at
312: “The fact that it is done quickly does not make any difference. Let any one try to hold his hand
over a flame for two seconds, and I think he would say that half a minute, not to say a minute, was a
long time for an operation of this kind” (per Kelly C.B.).
86 Radford, supra note 53 at 198, 243. See also SPCA (Singapore), “Proposal”, supra note 4 at paras. 13–44,
which recommended the express recognition of the relevance of mental suffering.
87 Patchett, supra note at 85.
88 Ibid. at 64. But see Part V.D.6 below on the offence of killing.
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The prosecution, therefore, should always tender evidence of suffering, especially
when it is not apparent from ordinary observation.89
The suffering of the animal must also be ‘unnecessary’. In Ford v. Wiley, the court
explained that the infliction of suffering is not unnecessary if it was carried out in
pursuant to an adequate and reasonable object, and the amount of suffering inflicted
is not disproportionate to the benefit attainable from the fulfillment of such object
(hereinafter the “Ford v. Wiley test”).90 This is a two-stage test.
The court must first determine the legitimacy of the object, i.e. whether it is
adequate and reasonable. If the court decides that there is no legitimate object,
it may conclude right away that the suffering is unnecessary. As Professor Sankoff
observes, the law regards an object to be illegitimate only if it is contrary to “accepted
human values”, such as for the fulfillment of one’s sadistic desire or for no reason at
all.91 On the other hand, the list of ‘legitimate’uses of animals is “virtually endless”,
extending beyond essential uses (e.g., for consumption) to non-essential uses (e.g.,
for entertainment).92 It is important that the legitimacy of many ‘accepted’ uses of
animals be reevaluated.93
Where the court finds an object to be legitimate, it would proceed to balance the
interest of the animal in not suffering against the interest of humans in having the
object fulfilled. Factors to be taken into account include the benefits attainable and
the amount of suffering caused to the animal. Each case is necessarily fact-specific.
As Hawkins J. explained in Ford v. Wiley: “[t]o attain one object the infliction of
more pain may be justified than would be ever tolerated to secure another”.94
A straightforward example is Barnard v. Evans, where the court convicted the
defendant for shooting a trespassing dog.95 Although there was a legitimate object
of chasing the dog away, it was “not reasonably necessary” to resort to such an
extreme measure of shooting it.96
In Ford v. Wiley, the defendant farmer was charged for cruelly ill-treating, abusing
and torturing his oxen by sawing off their horns. Expert witnesses gave evidence that
the operation caused extreme and prolonged pain to the animals. But the defendant
contended, among other things, that it would enable more of them to be stowed in the
straw yard and would increase their market price. In finding against the defendant,
89 See e.g., R. v. L [2009] EWCA Crim 2028, where the prosecution proved ‘suffering’ by tendering
veterinary evidence to show that the pony that was shot would have taken five minutes to die.
90 Ford v. Wiley, supra note 17 at 215 (per Lord Coleridge C.J.) and 220 (per Hawkins J.).
91 Peter Sankoff, “The Welfare Paradigm: Making the World a Better Place for Animals?” in Sankoff &
White, supra note 1 at 7, 23.
92 Ibid. at 23. See also, Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights, supra note 18 at 55: “we have decided—
before we even start our balancing process—that it is morally acceptable to use animals for food, hunting,
entertainment, clothing, experiments, product testing, and so forth”.
93 Where an object is expressly or impliedly sanctioned by legislation, however, it would be beyond the
court’s power to impose an outright ban. For example, where the law imposes licensing requirement
for a certain use of animals, it is implied that the object of such use is legitimate, for it could be lawfully
carried out with a licence.
94 Ford v. Wiley, supra note 17 at 218. See also Menard, supra note 17 at 464: “Everything is therefore
according to the circumstances, the quantification of the suffering being only one of the factors in the
appreciation of what is, in the final analysis, necessary” (per Lamer J.A.).
95 Barnard, supra note 83.
96 For a contemporary Malaysian example, see “Hawker admits to scalding dog to chase it away” The Star
(16 March 2012) at 26.
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Lord Coleridge C.J. said: “[T]o put thousands of cows and oxen to the hideous
torments… in order to put a few pounds into the pockets of their owners is an instance
of such utter disproportion between means and object, as to render the practice as
described here not only barbarous and inhuman, but I think clearly unlawful also”.97
Ford v. Wiley confirms that profitability, although relevant, does not always trump
the animal interest even in the case of farm animals.98 Similar conclusions are likely
to be reached in cases involving other painful operations (such as castration, tail
docking, debeaking, disbudding, branding, etc.) especially if carried out improperly,
e.g., without using anaesthetic.
However, where the infliction of suffering is part of an established practice of
the relevant industry and is not explicitly prohibited by the law, courts may be less
inclined to find it unacceptable. The defendant in Roberts v. Ruggiero, who wanted
to produce white veal, raised calves by keeping them continuously tethered in indi-
vidual crates so tight in space that they were unable to turn around, and fed them
exclusively on liquid.99 The charge of cruelty against the defendant was dismissed
because the infliction of suffering was “[not] beyond that which was general in ani-
mal husbandry”. The court refused to consider other systems of husbandry that may
cause less suffering while achieving the same result. This approach is problematic
for it allows a section of the industry to define what is acceptable, although others
in the industry or persons outside the industry may think otherwise.100 The practice
in Roberts v. Ruggiero attracted considerable criticism resulting in its ban by legis-
lation two years later.101 The point is that the court was in a perfectly appropriate
position to have done the same. At the very least, the court should be prepared to find
a practice to be unacceptable if similar result could be achieved by other practices
that may cause less suffering and do not involve significant increase in cost. Also,
even if a particular practice confirms with guidelines or regulations laid down by the
law or relevant authorities, the courts should not regard them as conclusive of the
97 Ford v. Wiley, supra note 17 at 215.
98 Farm animals, however, are treated very different from companion animals. Cows and sheep are likely
to make as good and loving companion animals as cats and dogs. We do not keep them only because
they are too large for the very limited spaces that we have. But because the law is predicated on a model
that focuses on utility, equal protection is very difficult to achieve. Also, the interests of farm animals
are generally under-represented since most people do not actually see what happens to them. Greater
protection is likely to be more actively sought if the farming practices are more widely known. See
Siobhan O’Sullivan, “Australasian Animal Protection Laws and the Challenge of Equal Consideration”
in Sankoff & White, supra note 1 at 108–127.
99 (3 April 1985), unreported (Q.B.). Quotations are taken from the unreported transcript of the judgment.
100 See Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights, supra note 18 at 59: “Such framework will accept the
standard of “necessity” defined by animal property owners”. See also Francione, Rain Without Thunder,
supra note 21 at 130: “The question whether the conduct is “necessary” is decided not by reference to
some moral ideal but by reference to norms of exploitation already deemed legitimate”.
101 Welfare of Calves Regulations 1987 (U.K.) (S.I. 1987/2021) (later replaced by the Welfare of Livestock
Regulations 1994 (U.K.) (S.I. 2004/2126)). Two decades earlier, the Brambell Committee recom-
mended: “In principle we disapprove of a degree of confinement of an animal which necessarily
frustrates most of the major activities which make up its natural behaviour… An animal should at
least have sufficient freedom of movement to be able without difficult to turn around, groom itself, get
up, lie down and stretch its limbs”. See Brambell Committee, Report of the Technical Committee to
Enquire into the Welfare of Animals Kept Under Intensive Husbandry Systems (London: Her Majesty’s
Statutory Office, 1965) at para. 37. This report was in response to concerns raised in Ruth Harrison,
Animal Machines: The New Factory Farming Industry (London: Vincent Stuart Publishers, 1964).
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reasonableness of the practice but should merely regard them as relevant factors to
be taken into account.
While the Ford v. Wiley test is capable of wide application, it appears to be less
easy to apply in cases involving suffering caused by omission, particularly those
arising from carelessness or ignorance. For example, it makes no sense to say that a
person who frequently forgets to feed his pet causes it unnecessary suffering because
the omission fulfilled no legitimate purpose. Instead, it is more appropriate to ask
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have done something
to prevent the suffering of the animal. This imports a duty of care to protect the animal
from suffering, the standard of which is to be decided objectively by reference to that
of a reasonable person.102 In essence, the Ford v. Wiley test is merely one method
of determining whether the defendant’s conduct has or has not fallen below what
a reasonable person would consider to be acceptable.103 In appropriate cases, the
courts should be prepared to address the requirement of unnecessary suffering by
direct reference to the standard of a reasonable person, unencumbered by the Ford
v. Wiley test.104
It was once suggested that the offence requires proof of either intention to cause
suffering or knowledge that suffering has been caused.105 But this would allow
too many cases to fall through the gap. Animals often suffer not from intentional
cruelty but from their owners’ negligence or indifference. Although this may not
be as morally culpable as to callously abuse an animal, it is important that liability
be extended to such cases so that enforcement action could be taken to help the
animals. Fortunately, the traditional view has been discarded since the end of the
nineteenth century. In Duncan v. Pope, Lawrence J. clarified that the only question
is whether there was “cruelty in fact” and “the intention of the [defendant] in doing
this does not matter”.106 The reasons for rejecting the requirement of intention
were explained by Cooper L.J.G. in the Scottish case of Easton v. Anderson: “[It]
would… unwarrantably impede the administration of a beneficial statute by requiring
the prosecution to assume a very difficult and often impossible onus and by perhaps
penalising the intelligent and sensitive, while allowing the callous, indifferent or
ignorant to escape”.107 Similarly, in Ford v. Wiley, the court rejected the view that
a defendant could escape liability by pleading ignorance, for to allow so will render
many animals “suffering victims of gross ignorance and cupidity”.108
102 See Part V.C.2 below.
103 Ford v. Wiley, supra note 17 at 220: “Where a desirable and legitimate object is sought to be attained,
the magnitude of the operation and the pain caused thereby must not so far outbalance the importance of
the end as to make it clear to any reasonable person that it is preferable the object should be abandoned
rather than that disproportionate suffering should be inflicted” (per Hawkins J.).
104 This finds support from the case of Hopson, supra note 82, where a bird the accused kept in a wire
aviary, for no less than six weeks, repeatedly flew into the wire mash and thereby seriously injuring
itself. In convicting the accused for cruelly ill-treating the bird, Simon Brown L.J. said: “The one thing
that should not have been allowed to happen which in my view objectively constituted the offence of
cruel ill-treatment was to allow this bird, for six weeks, to traumatise itself by repeatedly flying into the
netting and thus creating this open wound” [emphasis added].
105 See Radford, supra note 53 at 224–27.
106 (1899) 63 Justice of the Peace Reports 217. See also Bowyer, supra note 83 at 255.
107 1949 Justiciary Cases 1 at 6.
108 Ford v. Wiley, supra note 17 at 225 (per Hawkins J.).
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3. WCA (MY)
Under the WCA (MY), a person commits an offence if he “beats, kicks, infuriates,
terrifies, tortures, declaws or defangs any wildlife”.109 Curiously, the terms ‘ill-
treats’, ‘overrides’, ‘overdrives’ and ‘overloads’ were omitted, resulting in a reduced
scope compared to its AA (MY) equivalent. However, the offence is rendered easier
to establish since the adverb ‘cruelly’ was omitted, meaning that there is no need to
establish unnecessary suffering.
C. Causing Unnecessary Suffering by Wanton,
Unreasonable or Wilful Conduct
1. General
It is an offence under the ABA (SG) and the AA (MY) to cause unnecessary suffering
to an animal by wantonly or unreasonably doing or omitting to do anything.110 The
WCA (MY) differs only in that it replaces the adverbs ‘wantonly or unreasonably’
with ‘wilfully’.111 This offence is potentially wider than the offence of cruel ill-
treatment since it refers to any act or omission without the constraints of a catalogue
of specific conducts.112 Consider the example of a person who, out of affection,
over-indulges his companion animal with food and thereby causes it to fall ill. While
it would be strange to say that he has ill-treated the animal, it makes sense to say that
he has acted unreasonably by failing to control the diet of the animal as a reasonable
owner would have.113 The explicit mention of omission is also important since a
substantial portion of cruelty cases are caused by neglect, and it may not be clear to
law enforcement personnel that the term ‘ill-treats’ includes omission.114 This may
explain why most instances of cruelty by neglect were brought under this offence.
It is also important to clarify here a limitation to finding a person guilty of cruelty
by omission. The law is generally reluctant to impose legal responsibility based on
pure omission in the absence of some relationship between the defendant and the
victim.115 Clearly, a passerby is under no duty to aid a person in distress, let alone
an animal. Therefore, borrowing from the law of tort, a duty to prevent or alleviate
unnecessary suffering arises only where a person voluntarily assumes responsibility
109 WCA (MY), supra note 50, s. 86(1)(a).
110 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(1)(d); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(d).
111 WCA (MY), supra note 50, s. 86(1)(f).
112 This is particularly important in the context of the WCA (MY), supra note 50, since the term ‘ill-treats’
is omitted.
113 See e.g., R.S.P.C.A. v. David and Derek Benton (12 January 2007), unreported (Mag. Ct.) [David and
Derek Benton], where the defendants were convicted for causing unnecessary suffering to their pet
Labrador, Rusty, by overfeeding it. The vet described Rusty, which weighed almost 70 kilograms, as
looking like a walrus.
114 But see Banjoor, supra note 81; Hopson, supra note 82.
115 See Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd
ed. (Singapore: Lexis Nexis, 2012) at paras. 3.8–3.19; A.P. Simester et al., Simester and Sullivan’s
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 4th ed. (Oxford; Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2010) at
68–70.
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for the care of an animal.116 In other words, only neglect by a person who is
responsible for the care of an animal may amount to cruelty.117
2. Wantonly or unreasonably
The term ‘wantonly’ is virtually extinct from modern statutes and textbooks.118 One
suggestion is that to act wantonly means to act without a reasonable object.119 In
the Scottish case of Jack v. Campbell, the accused shot a trespassing dog, causing
it severe pain and suffering.120 The defendant was acquitted of a charge of wanton
cruelty121 although the court found his action to be neither justified nor proper in the
circumstances.122 The only possible explanation is that his action was in pursuant
to a reasonable object, i.e. to chase the dog away. Such definition of ‘wantonly’
is clearly unsatisfactory for it does not take into account the reasonableness of the
means of achieving the object and it is often easy for a defendant to show a legitimate
object and thereby, escaping liability. The courts, it seems, have decided to avoid
any attempt to interpret this difficult term. The focus, instead, has been on the term
‘unreasonably’, since proving either ‘wantonly’ or ‘unreasonably’ is sufficient.
When dealing with cruelty by positive conduct, it is submitted that the Ford v.Wiley
test should apply.123 That test, as said earlier, is an accepted method for determining
reasonableness. For cruelty by omission, the appropriate test is whether a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position would have prevented or alleviated the suffering
of the animal. The courts, however, could not seem to agree on an interpretation.
In Peterssen v. R.S.P.C.A., the defendant kept dogs in his two caravans, one of
which had a faulty door.124 It was therefore his practice to place a wooden pallet
against that door to secure it. One day he left the caravans without doing so. The
dogs escaped, killing and injuring a number of sheep. The court explained that
the offence required the defendant to have ‘guilty knowledge’, i.e. knowledge or
foresight that unnecessary suffering would be caused to the animals in consequence
of his omission. As the defendant was found to have such knowledge, he was
convicted. While the result of the case is unlikely to be disputed, its reasoning has
been criticised for it rendered the adverb ‘unreasonably’ redundant. Rather than
116 W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 18th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010) at paras. 5–28,
5–29. See also Yeo, Morgan & Chan, supra note 115 at para. 3.15.
117 See Banjoor, supra note 81, where Murison C.J. referred to “the owner of an animal”.
118 See Yeo, Morgan & Chan, supra note 115 at para. 38.8, who described the term as one likely to cause
“puzzlement”.
119 See e.g., Clarke v. Hoggins (1862) C.B.(N.S.) 545 at 551: ““wantonly” means, not having a reasonable
cause” (per Willes J.); R. v. Lee (Adam Matthew) [2005] EWCA Crim 62 at para. 9: “a wanton act of
cruelty, perpetrated without any justification”.
120 (1880) 8 R.(J.) 1 [Campbell].
121 The phrase ‘wanton cruelty’ was derived from the preamble of the Cruelty to Animals (Scotland) Act
1850 (U.K.), 13 & 14 Vict., c. 59, s. 1 of which set out the same offence as the ABA (SG), supra note 48
s. 42(1)(a) and the AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(a).
122 Campbell, supra note 120 at 1: “I am far from saying that what the accused did was justifiable or proper
in the circumstances. If he had wished to scare the dog away he might have done so by throwing stones
at it, or in a like way” (per Lord Adam). But note that the case preceded Ford v. Wiley, supra note 17,
and Barnard, supra note 83.
123 See Part V.B.2 above.
124 (23 March 1993), unreported (Q.B.) [Peterssen]. Quotations are taken from the unreported transcript
of the judgment.
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imposing a requirement of guilty knowledge that the statutory wording does not
provide for, it would make more sense to read ‘unreasonably’ as imposing a duty of
care to not cause unnecessary suffering. This finds support from Professor Smith’s
comment on the case: “[The offence] required proof only that, by unreasonably
omitting to do any act, the [defendant] caused unnecessary suffering. The offence
is one of negligence. Talk of mens rea and “guilty knowledge” is confusing and
misleading”.125
The objective test was applied in two later cases. In Hall v. R.S.P.C.A., the defen-
dant pig farmers were convicted for causing unnecessary suffering to pigs that had
septic arthritis in their joints together with associated lesions by unreasonably omit-
ting to seek veterinary advice, preferring to treat the pigs themselves for three weeks
until they reach optimum weight for slaughter.126 Holland J. explained that the term
‘unreasonably’ connotes a “purely objective test” and judged the reasonableness of
the defendants’ conduct based on the standard of “the reasonably competent, reason-
ably humane, modern pig farmer”. In R.S.P.C.A. v. Isaacs, which was decided the next
day by the same court, the defendant was charged for causing unnecessary suffering
to a sick and elderly dog by unreasonably omitting to provide it with the necessary
veterinary care and attention.127 Holland J. explained that the omission would be
unreasonable if, “viewed objectively… no reasonably caring, reasonably competent
owner would be guilty of a similar omission”. The defendant was found guilty, as
the state of the dog “was plainly inconsistent with objectively reasonable care”.
In Hussey v. R.S.P.C.A., however, the court expressed its preference for an inter-
mediate interpretation.128 Here, a dog in the defendant’s care was suffering from
substantial weight loss. She was charged for unreasonably omitting, as a result of
her failure to obtain professional advice on the matter, to provide the dog with an
adequate diet suitable for its breed, age and condition, thereby causing it unnecessary
suffering. On the issue of unreasonableness, the court was attracted to the suggestion
that the defendant must have knowledge of the condition of the dog, i.e. the substan-
tial weight loss, but not of its suffering or the possibility.129 Latham L.J. went further
to suggest that thereafter an objective test would apply,130 i.e. whether a reasonable
person with such knowledge would have acted as the defendant did. However, the
court refrained from forming any conclusive view on the matter since the defendant
was found to have the “necessary knowledge and foresight” of the kind required in
Peterssen such that she would have been guilty on any interpretation.
The significance of adopting an objective test as compared to one that requires
some form of subjective mental element has already been explained.131 It is for the
same reasons that the interpretation taken in Hall and Isaacs should be adopted.
125
“Protection ofAnimalsAct 1911, s.1(1)—CausingAny Unnecessary Suffering to anAnimal byWantonly
or Unreasonably Doing Any Act” [1993] Crim. L. Rev 852 at 853 (editorial comment by Professor
J.C. Smith).
126 (11 November 1993), unreported (Q.B.) [Hall]. Quotations are taken from the unreported transcript of
the judgment.
127 (12 November 1993), unreported (Q.B.) [Isaacs]. Quotations are taken from the unreported transcript
of the judgment.
128 [2007] EWHC 1083 (Admin.) [Hussey].
129 Ibid. at para. 15 (per Davis J.), para. 22 (per Latham LJ).
130 Ibid. at para. 22.
131 See Part V.B.2 above.
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Under the objective test, the defendant must be judged by the standard of a rea-
sonable person occupying the same position.132 To what extent, however, should
the attribute or plight of the defendant be taken into account? In R.S.P.C.A. v. C, a
15 year-old girl, who had failed to convince her father that the family cat required
veterinary attention for a tail injury, was charged for unreasonably omitting to take
steps herself to alleviate its suffering, e.g., by bringing the cat to the vet.133 The
court acquitted her because it was not unreasonable for a person of her age and
position in the household to accept her father’s decision. This seems to be at odds
with Isaacs where the court referred to a “reasonably caring, reasonably competent
owner”. Surely, most young animal owners would fall short of this attribute. The
preferable approach is to ignore entirely the defendant’s attribute and plight. As
Professor Radford said, “factors such as a lack of appreciation of the animal’s needs,
the defendant’s domestic or financial situation, or his health or mental state, may be
relevant in deciding whether to prosecute or the severity of the punishment, but they
should not be taken into account in determining guilt”.134
3. Wilfully
The use of the term ‘wilfully’under theWCA (MY) is particularly curious, as are many
of its other deviations from the AA (MY).135 As Professor Andrews said three decades
ago, “much would have been gained if it had been struck out of the Parliamentary
draftsman’s dictionary many years ago”.136 It is unfortunate that we are forced
to revisit in a 21st century statute, an outdated term that is susceptible to so many
interpretations.
First, ‘wilfully’ may be interpreted as requiring proof of intention to commit
the offence. In Willmott v. Atack, the defendant was charged for having wilfully
obstructed a prosecutor in the execution of his duty by interfering in the arrest of
another person.137 As the defendant only intended to help and not to obstruct the
prosecutor, the requisite mens rea was not established.
The second interpretation is that of R. v. Sheppard,138 where the defendants were
charged under s. 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933139 for wilfully
omitting to seek medical aid for their sick child, resulting in his death. The House
of Lords (by a bare majority) refused to interpret ‘wilfully’ to mean ‘voluntarily’.140
Lord Diplock thought that such an interpretation would render the word otiose, for
even absolute or strict liability offences require voluntariness. Instead, it must be
132 Radford, supra note 53 at 253: “A veterinary surgeon will be judged by the standards of that profession;
a farmer by those common in the industry; and the owner of a companion animal would be expected to
meet the standards of the responsible amateur”.
133 [2006] EWHC 1069 (Admin.). The father, who decided that the cat should not receive medical attention
unless its condition worsens, was earlier found guilty of a charge of identical terms.
134 Radford, supra note 53 at 240.
135 WCA (MY), supra note 50, s. 86(1)(f).
136 J.A. Andrews, “Wilfulness: A Lesson in Ambiguity” (1981) 1 L.S. 303.
137 [1977] Q.B. 498.
138 [1981] A.C. 394 [Sheppard].
139 (U.K.), 23 & 24 Geo. V, c. 133.
140 This interpretation found favour with the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal: (1980) 70
Cr. App. R. 210, citing R. v. Senior [1899] 1 Q.B. 283 at 290, 291 and R. v. Lowe [1973] Q.B. 702
at 707.
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shown “either that the parent was aware at that time that the child’s health might be
at risk if it were not provided with medical aid, or that the parent’s unawareness of
this fact was due to his not caring whether his child’s health were at risk or not”.141
A defendant who is genuinely unaware that the child’s health may be at risk could
escape liability.142 Here, the defendants’ convictions were quashed because their
failure to realise that the child was ill enough to require medical attention was due
to their low intelligence. The concept of a reasonable parent has no relevance.
The third interpretation relates to the now repealed Larceny Act 1861,143 which
made it an offence to “unlawfully and wilfully kill, wound, or take any house dove
or pigeon” (s. 21). In Hamps v. Darby, the defendant was convicted for killing
and wounding house pigeons although he “never directed his mind at all to the
question whether the pigeons were tame or wild”.144 Similarly in Cotterill v. Penn,
the defendant was convicted for killing a house pigeon, although he had mistaken it
for a wild pigeon.145 Lord Hewart C.J. explained that the offence “does not require the
element of mens rea beyond the point that the facts must show an intention on the part
of the person accused to do the act forbidden, which was here that of shooting”.146
In other words, it is sufficient that the defendant has made a conscious decision
with regards to his act or omission; he need not have intended its consequences.147
Wilfulness here refers to the voluntariness of the conduct.
Between these choices, the third interpretation based on voluntariness should be
adopted.148 Guidance may be derived from the minority judgments in Sheppard,
which justified such interpretation based on the policy need to protect children who
are vulnerable to incompetent parents.149 The analogy between this and the need
to protect animals from harm caused by incompetent owners and caretakers is not
difficult to draw.150 Moreover, it would be illogical to adopt an interpretation that
would make this offence more difficult to establish than its AA (MY) equivalent in
light of the emphasis on wildlife conservation.
4. Unnecessary suffering
For this offence, proof of unnecessary suffering is explicitly required in addition
to the requirements of unreasonableness, wantonness or wilfulness.151 In Hall and
141 Sheppard, supra note 138 at 408.
142 Ibid. at 408, 418.
143 (U.K.), 24 & 25 Vict., c. 96.
144 [1948] 2 K.B. 311 at 324 (per Lord Greene M.R. and Evershed L.J.).
145 [1936] 1 K.B. 53.
146 Ibid. at 61. See also Horton v. Gwynne [1921] 2 K.B. 661.
147 See e.g.,Yeo, Morgan & Chan, supra note 115 at paras. 3.25–3.27, who suggest that ‘voluntary omission’
means “controlled or willed inactivity”.
148 See also, Professor Radford’s interpretation of the term “wilfully” for the purpose of the PAA (U.K.),
supra note 52, s. 1(1)(d) (administration of poisonous drug or substance to an animal): Radford, supra
note 53 at 203.
149 Sheppard, supra note 138 at 423 (per Lord Fraser), 416, 417 (per Lord Scarman).
150 David and Derek Benton, supra note 113, for example, triggered a debate as to whether parents of obese
children should be guilty of an offence. See Kelly Banham, “Is the Law a Fat Ass?” (2007) 157 New
L.J. 269, cf. Tracey Elliott, “No Need For the Fat Police” (2007) 157 New L.J. 427.
151 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(1)(d); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(d); WCA (MY) supra note 50,
s. 86(1)(f).
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Isaacs, the courts held that ‘unnecessary’, for the purpose of this offence, means “not
inevitable”, in the sense that the suffering of the animal can be avoided, terminated or
alleviated by some reasonably practicable measure.152 This sets a very low threshold
for proving unnecessary suffering since there will almost always be some reasonably
practicable ways by which the animal’s suffering can be avoided, terminated or
alleviated. In Hall, the pigs could have been slaughtered sooner. In Isaacs, veterinary
advice could have been sought for the dog. The reason for this departure from
the usual test of objective reasonableness (i.e. the Ford v. Wiley test for positive
conduct and the reasonable person test for omission) is that it was already applied
in determining if the defendant has acted unreasonably. It would be superfluous to
repeat the exact same exercise in determining the issue of unnecessary suffering.153
However, since unreasonableness and unnecessary suffering must both be established
to find a defendant guilty, the lenient interpretation of unnecessary suffering does
not make a practical difference. For an offence requiring proof of unnecessary
suffering but not prefaced by the adverb ‘unreasonably’, the usual test of objective
reasonableness should apply. Otherwise, the offence will become overly easy to
establish.154
D. Specific Offences
1. Failure to supply sufficient food or water
It is an offence for a person who is in charge of an animal in confinement or in the
course of transportation, to neglect to supply it with sufficient food or water.155 The
word ‘neglect’ does not import an objective test, but merely refers to an omission
or failure, for whatever reason, to supply sufficient food or water. The question of
sufficiency is one of fact and the animal’s physical condition will normally be a good
indicator. The only drawback of this offence is that it makes no reference to the
adequacy of the food and water, although this could be addressed under the general
offence of causing unnecessary suffering by unreasonable or wilful omission.156
2. Causing unnecessary suffering by confinement, conveyance, etc
Under the ABA (SG) and AA (MY), it is an offence to confine, convey, lift or carry any
animal in such manner or position which causes it unnecessary pain or suffering.157
‘Confinement’should be interpreted broadly to also include confinement by chaining
or tethering. The equivalent under the WCA (MY) omits any reference to the acts
of conveying, lifting and carrying, but adds to the list the breeding of any wildlife
152 See also, Hussey, supra note 128.
153 Radford, supra note 53 at 251.
154 Mike Radford, “ ‘Unnecessary Suffering’: The Cornerstone of Animal Protection Legislation Consid-
ered” [1999] Criminal L. Rev. 702 at 707: “While this might be welcomed by some animal welfare
campaigners, it is clearly not the intention underlying the legislation”.
155 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(1)(c); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(c); WCA (MY), supra note 50,
s. 86(1)(b).
156 See e.g., Hussey, supra note 128, discussed in Part V.C.2 above.
157 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(1)(e); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(e).
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in such manner so as to cause it unnecessary pain or suffering, which includes “the
housing, confining or breeding of any wildlife in any premises which is not suitable
for or conducive to the comfort or health of the wildlife”.158
This offence addresses the prevalent problem of animals being confined for unnec-
essarily long duration and in tight spaces. Statistics from the SPCA (Singapore) show
that such cases form a substantial portion of cruelty complaints. While most such
cases involve companion animals, the same concern arises in the case of wild animals
in captivity.159 This offence also regulates the transportation of animals, especially in
the case of livestock. Long journeys with animals standing (usually cattle) or cramped
in cages (usually fowls) will be unlawful despite the profitability of doing so.160
3. Abandonment
In 2011 alone, the SPCA (Singapore) took in some 3,500 unwanted or abandoned
animals. While there is no equivalent statistics for Malaysia, the situation is no less
serious. Abandonment is a significant cause for the alarming number of stray dogs
in Malaysia, which ultimately become the subjects of institutionalised cruelty.161
Unfortunately, the AA (MY) does not set out a specific offence of abandonment,
although the general offences could apply to address the problem. The ABA (SG), on
the other hand, specifically makes it an offence for an owner of an animal to abandon
it without reasonable cause or excuse, whether permanently or not, in circumstances
likely to cause it unnecessary suffering or distress.162
While the offence of abandonment also relies on the concept of unnecessary suf-
fering, it is the only one that does not require proof of actual (unnecessary) suffering
but only its likelihood. This can be established, for example, by showing that the
place at which the animal is abandoned is dangerous or has no proper supply of food
or water. Therefore, while abandonment may also be dealt with under the general
offences, only this offence could apply where there is no proof of actual unneces-
sary suffering. As Professor Radford commented, “this prospective test meets the
principle which underlies the legislation, namely the protection of animals” and that
“policy makers and politicians should be looking to introduce a similar provision
wherever it is presently an offence to cause unnecessary suffering”.163
The concept of abandonment, unfortunately, has not been an easy one. In Hunt
v. Duckering, the court held that abandonment means leaving an animal unattended
“in circumstances where… the defendant has relinquished, or wholly disregarded,
or given up his duty to care for [it]”.164 Whether this is the case will depend on the
158 WCA (MY), supra note 50, s. 86(1)(c).
159 See e.g., the SPCA (Singapore)’s criticism regarding the housing of dolphins in small concrete swimming
pools in marine parks: “Dolphin Lagoon is too small: SPCA”, The Straits Times (10 September 2010)
at C6.
160 The person who procures the transportation may also commit a secondary offence. See Part V.E below.
161 See Part III above.
162 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(1)(f). The offence does not apply to a person who, although having
responsibility for the care of an animal, is not its owner. Cf. Abandonment of Animals Act 1960 (U.K.),
8 & 9 Eliz.II, c. 43, s. 1, which applies to “any person… having charge or control of any animal”.
163 Radford, supra note 53 at 245.
164 (15 March 1993), unreported (Q.B.). Quotations are taken from the unreported transcript of the
judgment.
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intention of the defendant, which could be inferred from the kind of arrangement (if
any) that has been made for the animal’s welfare during the period it was left unat-
tended. Where some arrangement has been made, albeit inadequate or insufficient
to prevent the animal from suffering, it is merely neglected, not abandoned. The
defendant has not relinquished his duty of care towards the animal.
To define abandonment in this way, while consistent with its ordinary meaning, is
problematic for a number of reasons. First, to import the requirement of intention is
inconsistent with the other offences based on the concept of unnecessary suffering,
which import only an objective test.165 This would raise the threshold for finding
liability. Second, the requirement that the defendant must have relinquished his duty
of care is incompatible with the concept of temporary abandonment since relinquish-
ment indicates a degree of finality.166 If the defendant has relinquished his duty of
care, the abandonment is clearly permanent, not temporary. The offence is therefore
rendered incapable of dealing with situations where the owner had merely left his
animal unattended for a limited duration. An example is where a dog is left in a hot
car for longer than necessary. The restrictive interpretation of abandonment in Hunt
v. Duckering therefore risks frustrating “the clear purpose of the provision, which
is to prevent animals suffering when they are left unattended, either temporarily or
permanently”.167 Professor Radford therefore suggests: “Instead of focusing exclu-
sively on intention, it would be more appropriate to ask, first, whether the defendant
had disregarded his duty to care for the animal by leaving it unattended in circum-
stances where it was likely to be caused unnecessary suffering; and if so, to consider
whether he had any reasonable cause or excuse for doing so”.168
4. Animal fighting and baiting
Animal fighting and baiting are absolutely prohibited under the Main Statutes.169
Although the animals would usually have suffered, the bare fact of fighting or baiting
is sufficient to give rise to the offence.170 It is also an offence to use or manage a
place for the purpose of fighting or baiting any animal, or to receive money for the
admission of any person to such place.171 It is not unlawful, however, for a person to
be present at an occasion where animal fighting or baiting takes place. The present
offence should be extended to cover this situation.172
165 Radford, supra note 53 at 207, 233, 234.
166 Ibid. In R.S.P.C.A. v. O’Sullivan, (15 April 1985), unreported (Q.B.), Schiemann J. described temporary
abandonment as “an unusual concept”. See also “Protection of Animals Act 1911, s.1(1)—Meaning
of Abandonment” [1993] Crim. L. Rev. 678 at 679: “The concept of temporary abandonment is a
difficult and perhaps inappropriate one. The court probably does the best that can be done with it by the
requirement that the defendant should have relinquished, or wholly disregarded, his duty to care for the
dog” (editorial comment by Professor J.C. Smith).
167 Mike Radford, ““Unnecessary Suffering”: The Cornerstone of Animal Protection Legislation Consid-
ered” [1999] Crim. L. Rev. 702 at 709.
168 Ibid. at 710.
169 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(1)(h); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(g); WCA (MY), supra note 50,
s. 86(1)(e).
170 See D.P.P. v. Barry, (24 April 1989), unreported (Q.B.).
171 The latter is omitted from the WCA (MY), supra note 50, s. 86(1)(e).
172 See e.g., PAA (U.K.), supra note 52, s. 5, which made it an offence for being present at such an occasion
without reasonable cause.
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5. Using an unfit animal for work or labour
Although technological advancements have significantly reduced the use of animals
in the production industries, they are still widely used for human entertainment, e.g.,
animal performances in zoos and amusement parks. It is an offence under the Main
Statutes to employ in any work or labour any animal, which due to any disease,
infirmity, wound or sore, or otherwise, is unfit to be so employed.173 Whether an
animal is unfit to be so employed will necessarily depend on its condition and the kind
of work or labour involved. While the latter normally refers to the physical demands
of the work or labour, whether the work or labour is of a kind that is unnatural to the
animal in question should also be relevant.
6. Kill, poison, maim or render useless
It is an offence under the Penal Codes to kill, poison, maim or render useless an
animal.174 The word ‘maim’ should be interpreted widely to include tail docking,
ear cropping, declawing, debeaking, and similar operations.175 It is also an offence
under the WABA (SG) to kill a wild animal without licence,176 and under the WCA
(MY), to kill protected wildlife without licence or permit.177 These are strict liability
offences, which require no proof of unnecessary suffering. Thus, a person who kills
an animal is guilty even if no pain or suffering has been inflicted on the animal, e.g.,
because the animal died instantaneously or was given anaesthetic.
7. Bestiality
The PC (SG) makes it an offence to “penetrate, with one’s penis, the vagina, anus
or orifice of any animal” or “cause one’s vagina, anus or mouth to be penetrated
by the penis of an animal”.178 The PC (MY) prohibits generally any voluntary
carnal intercourse with an animal.179 While ‘bestiality’, as such conduct is com-
monly called, may be seen as interspecies sexual assault, it has been pointed
out that not all forms of bestiality involve cruelty.180 It may therefore be that
the law, in criminalising bestiality, has taken no account of any harm that may
be caused to the animal.181 Instead, the offence is concerned with upholding
173 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 44(1)(g); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1)(f); WCA (MY), supra note 50,
s. 86(1)(d).
174 PC (SG), supra note 54, s. 428; PC (MY), supra note 55, ss. 428, 429.
175 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘maim’ to mean “wound or injure (a person or animal) so that
part of the body is permanently damaged”. See also Hammer v. American Kennel Club, 758 N.Y.S.(2d)
276 (2003) (NY S.C.) where the court held that mutilation includes tail docking.
176 WABA (SG), supra note 54, s. 5(1); WCA (MY), supra note 50, ss. 60–62, 68–70.
177 WCA (MY), supra note 50, ss. 60–62, 68–70.
178 PC (SG), supra note 54, s. 377B.
179 PC (MY), supra note 55, s. 377.
180 See generally, Piers Beirne, “Rethinking Bestiality: Towards a Concept of Interspecies Sexual Assault”
(1997) 1 Theoretical Criminology 317.
181 Michael Roberts, “The Unjustified Prohibition Against Bestiality: Why the Laws in Opposition Can
Find No Support in the Harm Principle” (2010) 1 J. Animal & Environmental L. 176.
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morality.182 As Professor Posner and Professor Silbaugh observed, “anticruelty
statutes are concerned both with the treatment of the animal and with the offence to
community standards, while antibestiality provisions… are aimed only at offences
to community standards”.183
E. Secondary Offences
A person who does not himself commit cruelty on an animal but causes it indirectly
may also be held legally responsible. The Main Statutes make it an offence for any
person to cause, procure or assist another person to commit cruelty, or for an owner
to permit his animal to be subjected to cruelty.184 While the statutory language is
silent, the case laws require the defendant to have knowledge of the cruelty.185 In
the case of animal owners, they are deemed to have permitted cruelty if they fail to
exercise reasonable care and supervision to protect their animal from the cruelty,186
entitling the court to find such owners liable based on negligence alone.187 It is
suggested that this should also extend to any person who is responsible for the care
of the animal.
The Penal Codes also set out the inchoate offence of abetment by aiding the com-
mission of an offence.188 While the relevant section explicitly stipulates that the
aiding must be performed “intentionally”, the case law indicates that it requires
only proof of knowledge of the circumstances constituting the crime.189 This
interpretation, while at odds with the statutory wording, finds academic support190
and also brings the offence in line with the secondary offences under the Main
Statutes.
182 The PC (MY), supra note 55, places the offence under the general heading of “Unnatural Offences”.
Similarly, the PC (SG), supra note 54, grouped the offence with similarly unnatural offences, such as
sexual intercourse with a corpse (s. 377).
183 Richard A. Posner & Katharine B. Silbaugh, A Guide to America’s Sex Laws (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996) at 207.
184 See ABA (SG), supra note 48, ss. 42(1)(a), (b), (d)–(h); AA (MY), supra note 49, ss. 44(1)(a), (b), (d)–(g).
Although the WCA (MY), supra note 50, makes no reference to causing cruelty by indirect means, it
could come under the general offence of causing unnecessary suffering by wilfully doing or omitting to
do anything (s. 86(1)(f)).
185 Crane v. Paglar [1888] 1 Straits Law Journal 72. See also Elliott v. Osborn (1891) 56 Justice of the
Peace Reports 38; Small v. Warr (1882) 47 Justice of the Peace Reports 20; Greenwood v. Backhouse
(1902) 66 Justice of the Peace Reports 519.
186 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(2); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(2).
187 Radford, supra note 53 at 221–24.
188 PC (SG), supra note 54, s. 107; PC (MY), supra note 55, s. 107. The other forms of abetment recognised
under s. 107 are instigation and conspiracy.
189 Roy S. Selvarajah v Public Prosecutor [1998] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 119 at para. 55 (H.C.): “The Prosecution
must prove that he knew the circumstances constituting the crime when he voluntarily did an act of posi-
tive assistance” (per Yong C.J.), citing Public Prosecutor v. Datuk Tan Cheng Swee [1979] 1 M.L.J. 166.
See also Public Prosecutor v. Hendricks Glen Conleth [2003] 1 S.L.R. 426 (H.C.), where the court went
further to suggest that an objective test may be sufficient.
190 Wing-Cheong Chan, “Abetment, Criminal Conspiracy and Attempt” in Wing-Cheong Chan, Barry
Wright & Stanley Yeo, eds., Codification, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code: The Legacies and
Modern Challenges of Criminal Law Reform (Singapore: Ashgate, 2011) 129 at 133, 134.
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VI. Exceptions
A. Exemptions
1. Killing animals for food
It is clear that animals may be lawfully killed for food.191 The ABA (SG) and the
AA (MY) explicitly exclude the application of the cruelty offences to the commission
or omission of any act which occurs in the course of preparing or destroying any
animal as food, “unless such destruction or such preparation was accompanied by
the infliction of unnecessary suffering”.192 The exemption is therefore qualified, not
absolute, since the protection against unnecessary suffering is preserved.193
2. Hunting
The WCA (MY) excludes the application of the cruelty offences to “any person who
wounds any wildlife in the course of lawfully hunting it”.194 However, the methods
in which animals are hunted raise serious concerns. For example, the use of certain
kinds of traps may cause great pain and suffering to the animals. Animals may
also be left to a slow and painful death before being retrieved.195 The WCA (MY)
empowers the Director General of PERHILITAN to prescribe “the methods or means
by which any wildlife may be hunted, including the type of arm or trap to be used”.196
Any person who hunts using impermissible methods would do so unlawfully and
thus falls outside the exemption. However, it remains difficult to understand why
the protection of animals from unnecessary suffering does not also apply to lawful
hunting, as hunting may cause animal suffering whether or not carried out lawfully.
B. Defences
The ABA (SG) and the AA (MY) do not provide defences to the offence of cruelty.
However, a defendant may avail himself of certain defences set out in Part IV of the
191 In Singapore, the slaughter of animals for food must be carried out at a licensed slaughterhouse: Whole-
some Meat and Fish Act (Cap. 349A, 2000 Rev. Ed. Sing.) The position in Malaysia is generally the
same: Animals (Control of Slaughter) Rules 2009 (P.U.(A.) 213/2009) [Control of Slaughter Rules];
Abattoirs (Privatization) Act 1993 (Act 507) [Abattoirs (Privatization) Act]. Under the Control of
Slaughter Rules, however, the veterinary authority may permit the slaughter of animals for religious
or customary purposes to be carried out outside the approved or licensed slaughterhouses (r. 13). The
WCA (MY), supra note 50, also allows an aborigine to hunt certain wildlife (see Sixth Schedule) for
sustenance (s. 51).
192 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(3); AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(3).
193 Certain customary or religious practices, however, are unlikely to be challenged. An example is the
‘halal’ slaughter method, which has raised concerns in many Western countries (it is banned in Sweden).
Any challenge is also likely to raise issues concerning the right to religious freedom, which is enshrined
in the constitutions of Singapore (Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Rev. Ed. Sing.),
art. 15) and Malaysia (Federal Constitution, art. 11).
194 WCA (MY), supra note 50, s. 86(2). The WABA (SG), supra note 54, does not provide for such exemption.
195 Cf. Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (U.K.), 1981, c. 69, which regulates how wild animals may be
hunted (see particularly, ss. 5, 11) and also imposes a duty on hunters to inspect their traps at reasonable
intervals (s. 11B).
196 WCA (MY), supra note 50, s. 35.
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Penal Codes, which apply equally to offences outside the codes.197 Of particular
interest is s. 81, which provides the defence of ‘necessity’: “Nothing is an offence
merely by reason of its being done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm,
if it be done without any criminal intention to cause harm, and in good faith for the
purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property”.198 Essentially,
this imposes a requirement of proportionality between the harm to be avoided and
the defendant’s response.199 As the concept of unnecessary suffering already entails
a balancing exercise, the defence of necessity will only play a meaningful role in
relation to those offences that do not require proof of unnecessary suffering. However,
the balancing exercise entailed by the defence is narrower than the Ford v. Wiley test,
since it does not apply where the object is anything other than the prevention of harm
to person or property. Similar defences are also set out in the WABA (SG) and the
WCA (MY).200
VII. Penalties
Under the ABA (SG), a person who commits an offence of cruelty is liable to a fine
not exceeding SG$10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 12 months or to both.201
For the same offence, the AA (MY) has until recently imposed a fine of RM200 or
imprisonment for a term of six months or both.202 The RM200 fine, which has been
the subject of much criticism, is plainly inadequate as a punishment or deterrent to
animal cruelty. In 2013, the penalties were finally increased to a fine not exceeding
RM50,000 or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both.203 This
will bring it in line with the WCA (MY), which for an offence of cruelty imposes a
fine not less than RM5,000 and not more than RM50,000 or to imprisonment for a
term not exceeding one year or to both.204
For the mischiefs of killing, poisoning, maiming and rendering useless an ani-
mal, the Penal Codes impose up to five years of imprisonment or to a fine or to
both.205 In the case of bestiality, the defendant shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term not exceeding 20 years, and shall also be liable to fine or to caning.206
197 PC (SG), supra note 54, s. 40; PC (MY), supra note 55, s. 40.
198 The references to ‘knowledge’ and ‘intention’ merely reflect the generality of the defence.
199 Yeo, Morgan & Chan, supra note 115 at paras. 23.18, 23.21, 23.24.
200 See WABA (SG), supra note 54, s. 6; WCA (MY), supra note 50, ss. 52–55.
201 ABA (SG), supra note 48, s. 42(1). The SPCA (Singapore) recommended that the maximum penalties
be doubled: SPCA (Singapore), “Proposal”, supra note 4 at paras. 81–93.
202 AA (MY), supra note 49, s. 44(1). This shall be read as imposing a fine not exceeding RM200 or
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or both: Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (Act
388), s. 60. In the case of an owner who has permitted cruelty by failing to exercise reasonable care and
supervision to protect his animal, he shall not be liable to imprisonment without the option of a fine:
AA (MY), s. 44(2).
203 Animal (Amendment) Act 2013 (Act A1452), s. 38.
204 Under the WCA (MY), supra note 50, s. 126, the Director General may, with the consent of the Attorney
General, offer to compound the offence for a sum not exceeding fifty per cent of the maximum fine.
205 The maximum term of imprisonment is five years under the PC (SG), supra note 54, s. 428 and PC
(MY), supra note 55, s. 429, and two years under the PC (MY), supra note 55, s. 428.
206 PC (SG), supra note 54, s. 377B(4); PC (MY), supra note 55, s. 377.
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There is no limit to the amount of fine the courts could impose, but it must not be
excessive.207
A person who unlawfully hunts a protected wildlife is liable under the WCA (MY)
to a fine that may extend to RM200,000 or to imprisonment for up to ten years or
to both, depending on the kind of wildlife hunted.208 The penalties are heavier for
hunting a wildlife that is immature (see Third Schedule), female or totally protected.
The WABA (SG), in sharp contrast, imposes only a fine not exceeding SG$1,000 for
the unlawful killing of a wild animal.209
In Singapore, the courts rarely sentence an offender to more than six months of
imprisonment even in very serious cases. The only instance where a court has done
so was in the case of a repeated offender.210 However, the courts are generally
willing to impose substantial penalties especially in the form of fines. In sharp
contrast, there were instances where Malaysian courts imposed fines below RM200
even for very serious cases.211 A way of addressing the courts’ reluctance to impose
substantial penalties is to impose by legislation a minimum penalty (see e.g., WCA
(MY)), which should be a penalty appropriate for “an offender who exhibits the
least degree of culpability”.212 Increasing the maximum penalty could also play
an indirect role in influencing the courts’ sentencing decisions. As Professor Wise
explains:213
The maximum penalty that a criminal statute allows is an important benchmark. It
signals to a judge how opposed legislators think a society actually is to a particular
wrong, for it sets the stiffest penalty that a wrongdoer who commits a crime in
the most unimaginably horrific way—or who commits it repeatedly—can suffer.
Because a judge usually will not impose a penalty near the maximum for a first or
“run-of-the-mill” offense, the typical penalty for cruelty will remain low so long
as the maximum penalty remains low.
The sentencing process could also be aided by the use of appropriate guidelines
based on different degrees of cruelty, taking into account factors such as the amount
of harm caused to the animal, the manner in which the harm was inflicted, the mental
state of the offender, etc.
The conventional responses of fine and imprisonment, however, are not always the
most effective means of dealing with cruelty. Most modern jurisdictions now allow
the courts to also impose an order disqualifying a person convicted of cruelty from
dealing with animals. A power to issue such an order, which may be more effective
207 Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev. Ed. Sing.), s. 319(1)(a); Criminal Procedure Code (Act
593) s. 283(1)(a).
208 WCA (MY), supra note 50, ss. 60–62, 68–70.
209 WABA (SG), supra note 54, ss. 5(1), 8(c).
210 See Public Prosecutor v. Hooi Yin Wang David [2006] SGDC 204, where the accused was sentenced to
one year of imprisonment.
211 See Part III above.
212 Public Prosecutor v. UI [2008] 4 S.L.R.(R.) 500 at para. 76 (C.A.).
213 Steven M. Wise, “The Evolution of Animal Law Since 1950” in Deborah J. Salem & Andrew N. Rowan,
eds., The State of the Animals II (Washington, D.C.: Humane Society Press, 2003) at 99.
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in preventing repeated cruelty, should be incorporated into the laws of Singapore and
Malaysia.214
VIII. Reform
There is a clear need for legal reform of existing cruelty laws in Singapore and
Malaysia. For this purpose, the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (U.K.),215 which is drafted
in a clear, simple and yet effective manner, serves as a good reference.
A. Clarity, Simplicity and Coherence
The offences under the AWA (U.K.) apply to “protected animals”, i.e. animals that
are “commonly domesticated”, “under the control of man whether on a permanent
or temporary basis”, or “not living in a wild state”.216 Wild animals will continue
to be protected under the Wild Mammals (Protection) Act 1996.217 The penalties
for cruelty are harsher under the AWA (U.K.). The likely reasoning is that once an
animal comes within close proximity to humans, or is under the control of a human,
there is a greater duty not to cause it unnecessary suffering.
The main cruelty offences are set out in s. 4.218 Under s. 4(1), it is an offence
for any person to cause, through any act or omission, unnecessary suffering to
a protected animal while knowing, or ought reasonably to have known, that his
act or omission has or is likely to have such effect. It is also an offence, under
s. 4(2), for a person responsible for an animal to permit, or to fail to take reason-
able steps to prevent, the causing of unnecessary suffering to the animal by another
person. It is therefore made plain that criminal liability could be found on negli-
gence alone. This is important because, as demonstrated by cases such as Peterssen
and Hussey, we cannot be certain that judges will adopt an objective test in the
absence of clear statutory language.219 Section 4(3) also sets out a non-exhaustive
list of factors to be considered when determining whether the animal’s suffering is
unnecessary:
(a) whether the suffering could reasonably have been avoided or reduced;
(b) whether the conduct which caused the suffering was in compliance with any
relevant enactment or any relevant provisions of a licence or code of practice
issued under an enactment;
(c) whether the conduct which caused the suffering was for a legitimate purpose,
such as—
(i) the purpose of benefiting the animal, or
(ii) the purpose of protecting a person, property or another animal;
214 SPCA (Singapore), “Proposal”, supra note 4 at paras. 118–133.
215 2006, c. 45 [AWA (U.K.)].
216 Ibid., s. 2.
217 (U.K.), 1996, c. 3.
218 The AWA (U.K.), supra note 215, also continues to set out specific offences: mutilation (s. 5), docking
of dogs’ tails (s. 6), administration of poisons (s. 7) and animal fighting and baiting (s. 8).
219 See Part V.C.2 above.
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(d) whether the suffering was proportionate to the purpose of the conduct
concerned;
(e) whether the conduct concerned was in all the circumstances that of a
reasonably competent and humane person.
The influence of past case law is clearly noticeable. Paragraph (a) captures the
meaning of unnecessary suffering explained in Hall and Isaacs.220 Paragraph (e)
adopts the test of objective reasonableness expounded in the same cases,221 while
paragraphs (c) and (d) codify the Ford v. Wiley test.222
B. Improving Animal Welfare
Professor Broom defines the welfare of an animal as “its state as regards its attempts
to cope with its environment”.223 The success (or failure) of the animal in so coping
is to be measured in terms of degree. As Professor Radford expresses, “at any given
time, the state of its welfare will be located on a point somewhere along a spectrum
between very good at one end, indicating an excellent quality of life, and, at the
other, so poor that it ultimately proves to be fatal”.224 Numerous studies have been
conducted to identify the measures of welfare, focusing on the animal’s physiological
and behavioural responses to the environment.225 In practical terms, one may say
that the extent of an animal’s success in coping with the environment depends largely
on the fulfillment of its needs.226
Where an animal is brought into human possession or control, it is not unrea-
sonable to require the person responsible for its care to maintain its welfare at an
appropriate level by ensuring that its needs are fulfilled. As Professor Whitfort said,
imposing a duty to this effect is “not unnecessarily burdensome” since “[t]he choice
to keep animals is voluntarily assumed”.227 The real breakthrough of the AWA (U.K.)
lies in its imposition of such a duty. Section 9(1) of the AWA (U.K.) imposes a positive
duty on a person responsible for an animal to “take such steps as are reasonable in
all the circumstances to ensure that the needs of [the] animal… are met to the extent
required by good practice”. Such “needs” would, according to s. 9(2), include: “(a)
its need for a suitable environment, (b) its need for a suitable diet,228 (c) its need to
220 See Part V.C.4 above.
221 See Part V.C.2 above.
222 See Part V.B.2 above.
223 D.M. Broom, “Animal Welfare: Concepts and Measurements” (1991) 69 J. Animal Science 4167 at
4168.
224 Radford, supra note 53 at 216.
225 D.M. Broom & A.F. Fraser, Domestic Animal Behaviour and Welfare, 4th ed. (Wallingford: CABI
Publishing, 2007) at c. 6; D.M. Broom & K.G. Johnson, Stress and Animal Welfare (Netherlands:
Kluwer, 1993) at cc. 5, 6; John Webster, Animal Welfare: Limping Towards Eden (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2005); David Fraser, Understanding Animal Welfare: The Science in its Cultural Context
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) at cc. 5–10.
226 See Donald M. Broom, “Animal Welfare: The Concept of the Issues” in Francine L. Dolins, ed., Attitudes
To Animals: Views in Animal Welfare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 129 at 135, 136.
227 Whitfort, supra note 2 at 360.
228 This goes beyond the duty to supply sufficient food and water under the main statutes. See Part V.D.1
above.
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be able to exhibit normal behaviour patterns, (d) any need it has to be housed with, or
apart from, other animals, and (e) its need to be protected from pain, suffering, injury
and disease”. Experts may be called to give evidence on other needs, especially of
a particular animal or type of animal, and whether or not they have been met in
accordance to good practice. As Professor Broom said, “[w]e need to know what
animals prefer if we are to treat them in a humane way”.229 In many cases, how-
ever, the courts would be well qualified to determine the matter based on common
knowledge. Good air, water, shelter, food and exercise (in the case of mammals) are
obvious basic requirements. If a person who wishes to acquire an animal is unsure
of what amounts to good practice, the onus is on him to seek professional advice
before the acquisition.
The most important difference between ss. 9 and 4 is that the former does not
require proof of (unnecessary) suffering. Traditional cruelty laws only apply when
an animal has (unnecessarily) suffered, i.e. the welfare of the animal has become very
poor. Animal welfare laws, on the other hand, seek to improve the lives of animals
by ordering persons responsible for them on how they ought to be properly cared for.
This will have a considerable impact on the lives of many animals, particularly those
that spend substantial portion of their lives confined. In practical terms, s. 9 would
allow enforcement action to be taken to assist an animal without having to wait until
it has actually suffered. While suffering is the clearest indicator of poor welfare, an
animal need not have suffered for its welfare to be poor. The animal may have yet
to experience the effects of its poor welfare. For instance, the welfare of an animal
may be poor, leading to increased risk of harm, although the harm has yet to occur.
Professor Broom provides an example:230
If the housing conditions or management procedures result in impaired immune
system function and consequently increase susceptibility to disease, then the state
of the animal is clearly affected and welfare is poor. This poor welfare occurs
before any suffering, although it may well become worse as disease and associated
suffering develop.
Likewise, the welfare of an abandoned animal may be poor because of the increased
risk of it experiencing starvation, falling ill, being run down by vehicles, etc.,
even if none of these has yet to occur when the animal is found. Thus, cases
of abandonment are now mostly dealt with under s. 9. Other examples of poor
welfare without suffering include reduced fitness (physical or biological) and
frustration.231
In Singapore and Malaysia, there are presently piecemeal efforts (mainly through
the requirement of licensing)232 to improve the welfare of animals in specific
229 Broom, supra note 223 at 4173.
230 Ibid. at 4169.
231 Ibid. at 4169, 4170.
232 However, it is important to recognise that the requirement of licensing does not necessarily safeguard the
welfare of animals. In Malaysia, whether the conditions for granting licenses contain welfare safeguards
are largely unknown.
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contexts: zoos,233 laboratories,234 farms,235 slaughterhouses,236 pet shops and exhi-
bitions.237 It is illogical not to extend the same to all animals under human care and
control. A general welfare law will go some way towards addressing the AVA’s ten-
dency to classify alleged cruelty cases as concerned with welfare issues.238 Like the
cruelty laws, however, the welfare standards are susceptible to restrictive interpre-
tations, often influenced by factors such as human benefits and established industry
practices. Ensuring a minimum standard of welfare, while undeniably a step for-
ward, is unlikely to do very much. It is therefore important that the courts and law
enforcement personnel align their definition of good welfare with expert and public
opinions, uninfluenced by industry biases.
IX. Conclusion
It is essential that animal protection laws be drafted in a way that is clear and intel-
ligible to all persons having a role to play in their interpretation and enforcement.
At the same time, such laws must remain flexible enough to reflect changes in pub-
lic opinion. As society progresses and moral values change, what was previously
regarded as lawful infliction of suffering may now be regarded as cruelty.239 One
way to achieve such balance is through the concept of unnecessary suffering, which
has the obvious merit of flexibility. It is important, however, to not leave such a wide
concept undefined. It is suggested in this paper that unnecessary suffering is best
interpreted as imposing a test of objective reasonableness, relying on the hypothetical
233 Under Malaysia’s Wildlife Conservation (Operation of Zoo) Regulations 2012 (P.U.(A.) 36/2012), zoo
operators must ensure that animal enclosures are clean (reg. 10), and be of certain sizes (reg. 6(1) and
Schedule) and design appropriate for the animals’ natural behaviour and basic needs (reg. 6(2)). The
animals must also be provided with suitable diet (reg. 8) and sufficient veterinary care (reg. 9). There
is no equivalent regulation in Singapore. But the use of premises for exhibition of animals must be
licensed: Animals and Birds (Pet Shops and Exhibition) Rules (Cap. 7, R. 2, 2004 Rev. Ed. Sing.) [Pet
Shops and Exhibition Rules].
234 In Singapore, any research facility that uses animals for scientific purposes must be licensed: Animals
and Birds (Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes) Rules (Cap. 7, R. 10, 2004 Rev. Ed. Sing.).
As part of the licensing requirements, the facility must comply with guidelines issued by the National
Advisory Committee for Laboratory Animal Research (NACLAR): see NACLAR, “Guidelines on the
Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes” (2004) (see especially cc. 2–6 for the welfare require-
ments). In Malaysia, a person who intends to kill any animal for the purpose of research or education
must first obtain a permit from the veterinary authority: Control of Slaughter Rules, supra note 191,
r. 13.
235 Animal farms in Singapore must be licensed: Animals and Birds (Licensing of Farms) Rules (Cap. 7,
R. 3, 2004 Rev. Ed. Sing.). The welfare of farm animals is to some extent safeguarded by the licensing
conditions: see AVA, “New Dog Farm Licence Conditions Safeguard Animal Welfare and Prevent
Cruelty”, AVA Vision (March Issue, 2009) at 8. In Malaysia, the licensing of farms is required under
various state legislations.
236 Slaughterhouses in Singapore must be licensed: Wholesome Meat and Fish Act (Cap. 349A, 2000
Rev. Ed. Sing.). See also, the Wholesome Meat and Fish (Slaughter-Houses) Rules (Cap. 349A, R. 4,
2001 Rev. Ed. Sing.), r. 8, which requires animals to be given sufficient rest and water before slaughter.
Slaughterhouses in Malaysia must also be approved or licensed: Control of Slaughter Rules, supra note
191; Abattoirs (Privatization) Act, supra note 191.
237 In Singapore, no animals can be sold, distributed or exhibited except under a licence: Pet Shops and
Exhibition Rules, supra note 233. In Malaysia, the licensing of pet shop is required under various
municipal by-laws.
238 See Part III above.
239 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th ed. Reissue, vol. 2 (London: Butterworths, 1991) at para. 407.
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reasonable person to supply the acceptable standard of conduct. The attributes of this
person will to some extent depend upon society’s attitude towards animal suffering
and exploitation. Of course, such attitudes are not always collectively held. Indus-
tries that exploit animals for profit may not have the same attitude towards animal
suffering as others, and may resist regulations which increase the costs of animal
care. It is important that we give careful consideration to what best represents the
moral values of our society and determine whether certain activities, although prof-
itable and advantageous to humans, should nonetheless be outlawed. The extent
to which we extend legal protection to animals may be seen as an indicator of our
society’s moral progress towards a world of more kindness and respect, and less
suffering.240
240 Stephens v. State, 65 Mississippi Reports 329 (1888): “Laws and enforcement or observance of laws for
the protection of dumb brutes from cruelty are… among the best evidences of justice and benevolence
of men” (per Arnold J.).
